The That by Lenman, J.
This is a repository copy of The That.




Lenman, J. (2020) The That. In: Suikkanen, J. and Kauppinen, A., (eds.) Methodology and 
Moral Philosophy. Routledge (Taylor & Francis) . ISBN 9780367664664 
https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429452284-8
This is an Accepted Manuscript of a book chapter published by Routledge in Methodology 





Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless 
indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by 
national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of 
the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record 
for the item. 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 





ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι, καὶ εἰ τοῦτο φαίνοιτο ἀρκούντως, οὐδὲν προσδεήσει τοῦ διότι.  
For the starting point is the that and if this is sufficiently apparent there is no need for the because.2 
1 
Exhibit A. Hare. 
In his famous paper ‘Nothing Matters’ R. M. Hare tells a story of how he was able to successfully 
provide philosophical therapy to a young Swiss lodger who had been impressed by a reading of 
Camus’ L’Étranger  with a vivid and paralysing sense that nothing matters.  After giving the problem 
some thought, Hare explained to the young man that talk of mattering was simply a way in which we 
express concern, typically, absent any signal to the contrary, that of the speaker and that while there 
might be people who find themselves lacking any deep concern about anything, he – Hare’s lodger – 
was not such a person.    
He was not in the position of the prisoner [i.e. the character in the novel whose words ‘rien n'a 
d'importance’ had made such an impression] but in the position of most of us; he was 
concerned not about nothing but about many things. His problem was not to find something 
to be concerned about – something that mattered – but to reduce to some sort of order those 
things that were matters of concern to him; to decide which mattered most; which he thought 
worth pursuing even at the expense of some of the other -  in short to decide what he really 
wanted.3 
Exhibit B. Mackie and Blackburn 
‘Morality’, write J. L. Mackie, ‘is not to be discovered but to be made; we have to decide what views 
to adopt, what moral stands to take.’4 This sentence, given its context of Mackie’s embrace of moral 
error theory,  puzzles Simon Blackburn. Would we really ‘choose to fall into error’? How might this 
work? Suppose you believe in the reality of moral facts on some relatively metaphysically robust 
understanding of what moral facts are. But then you read Mackie and come to be persuaded that 
here are no such facts. Morality, you come to believe, is all false and you decide to stop concerning 
yourself with it. But still, you find, you cannot help but continue to care a great deal about a great 
many things, about what you do, how you live, what kind of person you are to be, what kind of 
society your society is be, what laws and codes of behaviour will be in force there. You care about 
these things even though you no longer believe there are any robust moral facts. After all just caring 
about things doesn’t seem to presuppose the reality of any such things. So you find yourself 
reflecting on how to go about living your life in the light of these concerns you have. And you find 
yourself talking to other people about how to organize your society in the light of your and their 
concerns, a conversation making no reference to moral facts as a robust realism understands them 
                                                             
1 I am grateful for comments and discussion to Stephen Ingram, Anneli Jefferson Valerie Tiberius and Jack 
Woods 
2 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1095b. 
3 Hare 1972/2010, p. 47. 
4 Mackie 1977, p. 106. 
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but only to ‘lesser, purged commitments’ immune to any charge of queerness. Blackburn, in his 
lovely discussion of error theory,  proposes a name for this activity. He calls it shmoralizing. We can 
give up moralizing but, unless we are to simply stop caring about many of the things presently most 
important to us, it is hard to see how we might give up shmoralizing. We now need some suitable 
language in which to shmoralize, a vocabulary suitable for expressing the thoughts the shmoralizer 
might want to communicate and share. Happily we have something readily to hand that looks just 
about perfect for the job, namely the old, familiar, language of morals. Can’t we  shmoralise with 
that.But no sooner does this occur to us that  we cannot but start wondering if perhaps we were 
doing so all along.5 This is a beautifully telling thought experiment, intended to  embarrass the error 
theorist, as indeed it should.: if we ask what we would do if the error theorist persuaded us that 
morality was all false, answering to nothing in the furniture of the universe, the answer seems 
plausibly be that we would discard it, if at all, only to immediately reinvent it, a project that would 
make the most abundant sense without any need for some metaphysical ratification from any sort of 
queer furnishings. 
Exhibit C. Korsgaard and Tiberius 
Blackburn’s shmoraliser, at least as I reconstruct him above, like Hare’s recovering nihilist, finds his 
way into normative and evaluative thought by recognizing and being guided by the passions of his 
soul. Some baulk at this kind of voluntaristic sentimentalism. Christine Korsgaard, for example. in an 
influential paper identifies a position she characterises as that of the ‘heroic existentialist’. For this 
character the authority of reason rests on a source ‘as thin and insubstantial  as the agent’s arbitrary 
will, his raw and unmotivated decision that he will take a certain end to be normative for himself, for 
no other reason than that he wiils it so.’6 Of this view Korsgaard writes that ‘it is hard to see how a 
self-conscious being who must talk to herself about her actions could live with that solution.’7 
Valerie Tiberius in her magisterial paper ‘Humean Heroism: Value Commitments and the Source of 
Normativity’8 argues persuasively in response to Korsgaard that we can make this a bit less hard if we 
restrict the  range of willings we take to have serious purchase in the constitution of normativity. We 
should restrict these, Tiberius argues, to value commitments, commitments with which we stably 
identify and which are important enough to us to structure our thinking about how to plan and 
assess our lives. They are commitments that are robust under critical reflection and the agent herself 
is reflectively disposed to value. This is the basis for a Humean take on practical reason which 
recognizes no external standard for evaluating our commitments standing outside them and 
independent of them but  that escapes any charge of arbitrariness by allowing that they can certainly 
be, one by one if not all at once, the subject of reflective scrutiny.  Justification here is coherentist, 
Neurathian in spirit but the passions in our soul remain primary and without them there is nothing 
for normative thought to be. Tiberius here accepts something a bit like heroic existentialism but with 
a crucial qualification:  
 
Contrary to true existentialism, however, choice is not enough: to have normative force, these 
attitudes and choices must form a pattern that constitutes our taking ourselves to have 
                                                             
5See Blackburn 1993, pp. 149-150. 
61997, p. 252. 
7 Ibid., p. 251. 
8 Tiberius 2000. 
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reasons for these attitudes and choices.9 
 
Exhibit D. Murdoch 
Korsgaard’s paper was far from  the first time talk of existentialism had been heard outside its usual 
context in continental European philosophy. Iris Murdoch in ‘The Idea of Perfection’ uses the term to 
cover ‘both philosophers such as Sartre who claim the title and philosophers such as Hampshire, 
Hare, Ayer, who do not.’ 10 ‘Existentialism’, she writes: 
is an attempt to solve the problem without really facing it: to solve it by attributing to the 
individual an empty, lonely freedom,  a freedom, if he wishes, to ‘fly in the fact of the facts’. 
What it pictures is indeed the fearful solitude of the individual marooned upon a tiny island 
in the middle of a sea of scientific facts, moraliity escaping from science only by a wild leap 
of will. But our situation is not like that.11 
The latter claim is supported with the brilliant example of M and the evolution in her ideas about her 
daughter-in-law D.12 At first M believes D to be ‘while not exactly common yet certainly unpolished 
and lacking in dignity and refinement.’ D she considers ‘pert and familiar, insufficiently ceremonious, 
brusque, sometimes positively rude, always tiresomely juvenile’. Her son, she feels, ‘has married 
beneath him’. Later however M thinks on D further and experiences a large change of heart. ‘D is 
discovered to be not vulgar but refreshingly simple, not undignified but spontaneous, not noisy but 
gay, not tiresomely juvenile but delightfully youthful’. In the course of this change of heart, M 
convicts herself of being ‘old fashioned’, ‘conventional’, ‘prejudiced’, ‘narrow-minded’, ‘snobbish’ 
and ‘jealous’.  For Murdoch the role of these ‘secondary value words’  (what we now call thick ethical 
concepts) is crucial. This conceptual repertoire not of M’s making shapes and constrains her thought. 
The growth in moral understanding that we might attribute to M can be understood in terms of 
‘progress in understanding a scheme of concepts’, something that ‘often takes place as we listen to 
normative-descriptive talk in the presence of a common object’13. ‘The moral life’, she writes, ‘is 
something that goes on continually, not something that is switched off in between the occurrence of 
explicit moral choices.’14  Here Murdoch stresses two things that constrain our thought. The first is 
the world as we experience it in all its particularity to which we need to attend as M is attending to 
D. The second is the conceptual repertoire we bring with us to this exercise. ‘[I]f we consider what 
the work of attention is like, how continuously it goes on, and how imperceptibly it builds up 
structures of value round about us, we shall not be surprised that at crucial moments of choice most 
of the business of choosing is already over’.15  So the moral experience gained from ‘the work of 
attention’ shapes and is shaped by the shared evaluative conceptual scheme that ‘grows up round 
about us’ as that work goes on. 
Exhibit E: Taylor  
                                                             
9 Tiberius 2000, p. 428. For a more recent take on Humean existentialism see Street 2008, pp. 237-8.  
101971, p. 34 
11Ibid., p. 26. 
12Ibid., pp. 16-17. 
13Ibid, p. 31. 
14 Ibid., p. 36.  
15 Ibid. p. 36. 
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The ghost of existentialism walks again in Charles Taylor’s classic essay ‘What is Human Agency?’ 
when he writes: 
‘The Nietzschean   term ‘value’, suggested by our ‘evaluation’, carries this idea that our ‘values’ 
are our creations, that they ultimately repose on our espousing them.  But to say that they 
ultimately repose on our espousing them is to say they issue ultimately from a radical choice, 
that is, a choice that is not grounded in any reasons. ‘16 
This view Taylor attributes to Sartre and ‘an influential Anglo-Saxon school of moral philosophers’.   
This picture of radical choice represents, he argues, all that human agency can be for what he calls 
the ‘simple weigher’, pushed around by whatever desires and impulses happen to be strongest  and 
contrasts with the ‘strong evaluator’ who is able to employ a ‘vocabulary of worth’, a ‘language of 
contrastive characterization’ (‘the language of higher and lower, noble and base, courageous and 
cowardly, integrated and fragmented, and so on’)17. Partly this is a matter of reflective, higher order 
desires as emphasised in the work of Harry Frankfurt. But more is involved. Strong evaluation has a 
wider time horizon than mere appetitive desire. It is ‘about the quality of life, the kind of beings we 
are or want to be.’18 The space of value constituted by the strong evaluative concepts and 
convictions that shape my agency is at the core of who I am. Without it, ‘I would no longer be a 
subject capable of knowing who I was’.19 It is a bit unclear just what Taylor’s target here is. If it is the 
of roughly Humean strand in modern metaethics it is not clear if what he says will hit home very hard 
when confronted with a sophisticated Humean of more recent literature such as Tiberius. After all 
Taylor’s strong evaluations look very like Tiberius’ value commitments, stable, reflectively  endorsed, 
concerned with large issues about our lives as a whole and yet eminently Humean friendly.  But now 
I am getting ahead of myself. Before turning to discussion, there is one more exhibit.  
Exhibit F. Hurley. 
The essay by Taylor just discussed is a conspicuous influence on Susan Hurley’s 1989 book Natural 
Reasons. This tremendous tour de force is one of the great works of modern moral philosophy and, in 
my view, woefully under-discussed. It’s greatest impact on the subject arises from the fact that it was 
in in a review of it that Frank Jackson, riffing on Hurley’s ideas, comes up with an early formulation of 
so-called ‘Canberra Plan’ reductive naturalism about the normative. But to focus on that is to distract 
attention from Hurley’s own view which is rich and distinctive version of non-reductive naturalism. 
On Hurley’s view ‘to say a certain alternative ought to be done is to say that it is favoured by the 
theory, whichever it may be , that gives the best account of the relationships among the specific 
values that apply to the alternatives in question.’20 Moorean intuitions are neatly accommodated by 
allowing it to be conceptually an open question what theory that is.  We look for a theory that 
imposes coherence on these specific values as embodied in the thick ethical concepts that shape and 
are shaped by our shared ethical practices. This is not reductionist in the way Jackson’s moral 
functionalism aspires to be. With Jackson the reductionist aspiration is very questionably deliverable. 
The work there is done by a codification of the ‘platitudes’ comprising a ‘mature folk psychology’ and 
                                                             
161985, p. 29. 
17Ibod., p. 24. 
18 Ibid, p. 26. 
19Ibid., p. 35 
20Hurley 1989, p. 11. 
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the worry is that too much in the way of thick normative content will have to be built into the way 
we are to understand the word ‘mature’.21 Hurley’s nonreductive conception of theory, in contrast, is 
comfortably and unapologetically saturated with normative content. Coherence, crucially, is not a 
master value: 
a coherent theory about the relationship between conflicting pro tanto values does not 
subsume their reason-giving force or eliminate the conflict; unkindness, for example, is no 
more cancelled out by considerations of coherence than by those of justice. Considerations of 
coherence may give us reason to do the just thing rather than the kind thing, but they cannot 
themselves give us reason to act on considerations of coherence rather than on the pro tanto 
reason with which they conflict. Their role is not to eliminate conflict between other reasons 
and they are no more insulated from conflict with other reasons than other reasons are from 
conflict with one another. 22 
So this is not a formalist account where coherence is everything.  Such accounts are readily objected 
to on the grounds that all manner of awful and repellent normative sensibilies can readily enough be 
cooked up that are beautifully consistent and coherent. For Hurley this doesn’t get to happen. Moral 
theorising is not morally neutral but is moralised through and through. Theorising is responsible not 
only to coherence but to the other values expressed in our ethical practice. (Her metaethical position 
is thus distinctively constructivist in offering an account of normative concepts where normative 
concepts feature on the right as well as the left hand side of any defining boconditional, in the 
analysans as well as the analysandum.23) Hurley’s primary  target is what she calls subjectivism which 
takes preferences to be conceptually prior to values so that our philosophical understanding of the 
latter is taken to depend centrally and asymmetrically on a prior understanding of the former. Rather 
for Hurley the two are interdependent, arriving in the world together. 24 Indeed, and an argument to 
this effect is at the heart of her book, our values shape and constrain our very understanding of what 
our preferences are. 
She ends up with an understanding of deliberation as interpretation of the self that draws explicit 
inspiration from Taylor. 
Deliberation about conflicting ends involves a search for coherence as a kind of self-
interpretation-and-determination. It is in deliberating about ends that an agent exercises his or 
her autonomy; the value of autonomy emerges immediately from the need for deliberation 
and the search for coherence.25  
[D]eliberation is a kind of self-interpretation and as such is constrained in various ways  We are 
constrained to seek to understand ourselves and others as coherent agents in relation to 
various specific values; neither the search for coherence nor the values in terms of which it is 
carried out are optional for persons. 26 
                                                             
21 Cf. Yablo 2000. 
22Ibid., p. 318. 
23 Cf. Lenman 2012. 
24 Op. cit., p. 27. 
25 Ibid., p. 318. 
26 Ibid., p. 319. 
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Though autonomy has a special role in relation to other values, and indeed in making human 
beings distinctive among animals as self-interpreting animals, or persons, it is still one value 
among others, which may conflict with it.27 
Persons are self-interpreting animals, but they are animals, and stands in constitutive 
relationships to a natural and social world; indeed, their personhood is itself a natural fact, a 
product of the natural and social world, and stand in no tension with its own status as such. 
Personhood depends on the capacity for reflection on and evaluation of one’s own attitudes, 
for self-interpretation and self-determination, not on self-postulation ex nihilo.28  
Still drawing on Taylor, and also on Michael Sandel, she suggests the subjectivist position she 
opposes risks collapsing into a kind of nihilistic existentialism, where the self is shrunk to an 
‘extensionless point’, prior to its ends, leaving the project of seeking self-understanding with nothing 
to be, in contrast to a richer and more credible picture of agency where ‘the agent participates in the 
constitution of its own identity as a subject, in the lights of ends and goods already before it’. 
2 
Taylor and Hurley are of course far from alone in viewing normative inquiry as essentially an exercise 
in interpretation. Many others do. Dworkin in Justice for Hedgehogs argues that moral inquiry in 
essentially concerned with deepening and refining our understanding of such core normative 
concepts  as justice and freedom.29  Michael Walzer in Interpretation and Social Criticism compares 
what he calls the ‘way of invention’ and the ‘way of discovery’ (echoing of course the subtitle of 
Mackie’s Ethics) unfavourably with what he calls the ‘way of interpretation’.30 Most famously 
perhaps, John Rawls, in Political Liberalism, understanding his own project as an articulation of ideas 
lying at the heart of the public political culture of modern western liberal democracies.31  
The distinctive and central claim of Humean understandings of normativity is that we should see the 
passions in our souls as constituting, to echo Korsgaard, the source of normativity. Reason is the 
slave of the passions   In order of explanation, preferences, the passions in our souls, precede values 
and are what our judgements of value, as differing camps within the Humean tradition variously have 
it, describe or express. If you want to recognize and respect the autonomy of the normative domain, 
the expressivist camp is the more promising.  Like Hare, like Blackburn, like Tiberius, unlike Murdoch, 
unlike Taylor, unlike Hurley or Dworkin, I accept this picture, I affiliate to the Humean camp in 
metaethics, and yet I want simply to agree with much of what the friends of interpretation say and I 
hope here to persuade you that there is no tension. The radical voluntarism on offer in the sub-
existentialist picture of human agency they repudiate is indeed a fantasy. That is not remotely what 
deliberation or moral inquiry is like. The point I want to make is that the Humean is not committed to 
suppose it is. We can accept the interpretative story offered by Taylor and others. Normative  inquiry 
is an exercise in self-understanding of making sense of our shared values. But we may plausible insist  
that to count as normative inquiry interpretation must be that of an insider and not a dispassionate 
anthropologist. If you’re not emotionally plugged in, you’re really in the game. We can still persist in 
                                                             
27 Ibid., p. 319.a 
28 Ibid., p. 322. 
29 Dworkin 2013. 
30 Walzer 1993. 
31 Rawls 1993 
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endorsing the core Humean idea that, as Stephen Finlay elegant statement has it: “Normativity is the 
shadow cast by our desires in the external world.” 
 
Return to Blackburn’s thought experiment. I have, let’s pretend, always hitherto believed the robust 
realist picture of the normative domain. Then one day, persuaded by Mackie, perhaps, I stop 
believing this. But I still have desires. I want my day to be like this, not like that. I want my life to be 
like this, not like that. I want my community to be like this and not like that. Without my having to 
buy into any robust normative truths there is such a thing as intelligent thinking about how to go 
about my life, now and hereafter, in the light of these passions in my soul.32 So I set about doing that 
thinking. I seek, we might say ‘to reduce to some sort of order those things that were matters of 
concern to me.’  And talking.  For when it comes to the normative constitution of my community it is 
pretty futile to think about it on my own. I need to talk about this with others. I need to find out if 
my desires about how our community should be can be reconciled with theirs; or perhaps either 
their or mine may be modified and revised as discussion goes on. That discussion needs to happen 
and this is a project for us, not just for me. We need to codeliberate, to reduce to some sort of order 
those things that concern us.  It is very natural to read a story like this as a kind of genealogy,  a just 
so story setting out how, if ethical thought and normative concepts did not exist, we would have to 
invent them.  And it is very natural to think that this steers us in the direction of the way of invention 
and makes us heroic existentialists. 
A thought experiment like this, however admirable in bringing out the error in the error theory, 
might mislead us is in encouraging us to think of normative thought and conversation, of deliberation 
and codeliberation, as starting here, now, with me, with us. Which of course it does not and that is 
vitally important to understanding it. We do not arrive at this process at its beginning. Suppose we 
did. Suppose we now found ourselves a newly created species, tabulae rasae, all passions and no 
values, normative thought Day One. These imaginary circumstances are surely a historical fantasy. 
We likely had ethical practices in some rudimentary form before we had language.33  But never mind. 
Imagine them anyway, if only for the purpose of philosophical reconstruction,. From such a 
departure point it would plausibly be tough, desperately tough, to make real or rapid progress. But 
perhaps we make slow and faltering progress. Perhaps we begin by cobbling together fragile modus 
vivendi34 in the aid of mutual protection but our sensibilities evolve over time and the normative 
concepts that shape our social contract become absorbed into our identity as core aspects of what 
we stably want to be, become, at the level of individual psychology, something like evaluative 
commitments as Tiberius conceives them, while, at the level of community, the same repertoire of 
thick concepts might come to express shared normative understandings and stable shared practices.    
So as the normative conversation of a community, we might suppose, makes progress, slow but real. 
Things are decided. Things are agreed. And, crucially, the things that are decided and agreed can be, 
as it were, banked. They stay that way, at least presumptively as normative fixed points that can then 
guide and constrain subsequent discussion. What do I mean when I say, It is wrong to hit children? 
Well, perhaps my community has yet to take a view on this.  Me, however, I am pretty keen on the 
                                                             
32 Lenman 2014. 
33 See e.g. de Waal 2015. 
34Cf. Walzer 1993, lecture 1. 
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not-hitting of children. Let’s, I want to say at today’s meeting, have a Not Hitting Children rule. I really 
don’t think, I tell my peers, that  it would be OK for us to be without one. This, my lack of willingness 
to accept a set of community norms that tolerates child-hitting, is a plausible first take at what is 
meant when I say ‘It is wrong to hit children.’35 But only a first take. At the meeting my view prevails. 
The anti-child-hitting faction win, Our view is accepted and becomes part of the moral fabric of our 
community.  It goes in the bank. Now when I tell you ‘It is wrong to hit children’ I mean rather more 
than that. I mean something like what we might naturally express in the familiar  idiom of parental 
norm enforcement: In this house we do not hit children.  Telling you this I tell you what our 
community norm now is. But this is, at least in central cases, not something I merely report. My 
words also, in ordinary circumstances,  endorse the norm and command compliance with it. I have 
shifted from the expression if an evaluative commitment of mine to an evaluative commitment of 
ours. To this extent we would improve upon Stevensonian emotivism by moving from an analysis of 
‘X is good’ as ‘I approve of this, do so as well.’ to something more like the less individualistic ‘We 
approve of this. Do so as well.’ But I remain, at least ordinarily, emotionally plugged in. Were I merely 
dispassionately reporting that these were the roles round here that would be a quite different  kind 
of utterance, more anthropological; than normative.  
My normative thought does not begin now. I have been at it for years. And all those years of 
deliberation have given me a large range of, to echo Tiberius,  evaluative commitments which I 
arrived at long since and, as it were, banked. Of course any one of these commitments might come 
up for re-examination at any time but that cannot be the status of all of them all the time or my 
ability to flourish in a framework of projects and relationships would be paralysed by constant, badly 
overdone reflection. Tiberius emphasizes, in her book The Reflective Life, that evaluative 
commitments must be ‘appropriately stable’ where we are to understand this as ‘a disposition not to 
reconsider our commitments that is sustained by confidence in the value of the ends to which we are 
committed.’36 We find a similar idea in Gibbard. For normative thought to be possible I must be able 
to trust my past selves. ‘one must normally trust past conclusions without reviewing all one’s 
grounds. In effect, then, one accords authority to one’s past self.’37 But this point about intrapersonal 
extends to the interpersonal case also. ‘The influence of others has pervaded our thinking since 
before we could talk.’38 Rejecting the influence of others in the past is not a serious option for us. We 
are too deeply the creatures of our culture and our history for that to be a genuine possibility. An 
awful lot was already banked before I ever opened my personal account.  
Sometimes it might seem we start from scratch. Someone like Hare’s lodger who has become  
disaffected and alienated  might conceivably be amenable to the sort of philosophical therapy Hare 
describes where he is led to think himself back, gradually and painfully, to a healthier condition. This 
might seem, at least in its early stages, an individualistic affair. I care about this. I love this. I hate 
that. But it won’t stay that way. If the cure is to be completed a point has to be reached where ‘I’ 
gives way to ‘we’ as he works his way back into a sense of membership in a normative community.  A 
community moreover from which his exile was never complete as even the first faltering steps 
cannot but be framed in an inherited  conceptual repertoire not of his own making.  
                                                             
35 Cf. Lenman 2007. 
36 Tiberius 2008, 27. 
37 Gibbard 1990, 178. 
38 Ibid., 179. 
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Tiberius is right. Pattern is everything.  Normativity is grounded in desire, not in individual desires 
considered one by one but in a Big Web of desire that, viewed, as it were, from within, takes on the  
character of a space of reasons. We escape the charge of arbitrariness because of the horizontal  
connections that furnish unity and coherence to the web as a whole. And the pattern is not just 
intrapersonal but, of necessity, interpersonal.  We are social creatures who cannot, if we are to have 
any hope of flourishing, make our normative lives in isolation from each other. The space of our 
reasons and values is social and so, of necessity, historical. A normative world shared by thousands, 
or by millions, of people takes generations to take shape and is way too complex and unwieldy a 
beast to be turned round in undue haste or reconstituted from scratch.  
 
It is a fantasy, then,  that one might embark ex nihilo on normative thought beginning only with one’s 
‘arbitrary will’ in all its thinness and lack of substance, with a ‘raw’ decision to take some ends as 
normative for oneself.  Because the normative conversation of mankind does not begin here and 
now. It has been underway already for many thousands of years.  It supplies us with the normative 
culture in which we live and think, with the very conceptual repertoire with which, even as we think 
at our most critically about our traditions and institutions, even as we dissent from them, we cannot 
help operating. We might call this fantasy the ‘Existentialist Fallacy’, that the process of our 
normative self-constitution is something to be undertaken ex nihilo, right now, from a 
standing start. I wish, first, to acknowledge that it is indeed a fallacy. It isn’t like that and it can’t 
be. Murdoch is right. Our situation is not like that. The project of making our normative 
world is a project we inherit and pass on. I wish, second,  to urge that I can quite coherently and 
credibly join philosophers such as Blackburn and Tiberius on the Humean side of metaethical 
controversy without committing it. The picture of the Humean as committed to this extreme and 
arbitrary voluntarism is one that badly needs to be debunked.  
 
We begin with the passions in our souls. But we begin here at the level of philosophical 
reconstruction  and only there. Such a reconstruction tells a story of how these passions conflict and 
conflict engenders reflection, sets of a process off, as Blackburn calls it, ‘emotional ascent’39 whereby 
I decide which of my desires I welcome and endorse the influence of, which I would be happier 
without or for some other reason reject. This process embraces not just local desires for this or that 
to happen now but more global desires about my life as a whole or the life of my community.   So 
that my reflective desires are not just about what I want the structure of my motivations to be right 
now but how I want it to be with my longstanding character and with the characters of those among 
whom I live. And because I live among others, reflection becomes conversation, deliberation 
codelberation. From reflection there evolve, to echo Tiberius, evaluative commitments, desires 
about how I should live that shape my life as a whole that I find myself stably disposed to endorse in 
ways that are robust under reflective scrutiny. And notice how closely these Hume-friendly 
evaluative commitments are to Taylor’s strong evaluations. The Tiberian reflective evaluator is no 
Taylorian simple weigher even before we complete that still too individualistic picture with a story of 
how codeliberation sustained over generations creates a space of shared commitments and 
normative understanding that then shapes and constrains our thinking within it. 
                                                             
39 Blackburn 1998, 8-14. 
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When all this happen not just to me but to us, we end up with the minimal basis of moral 
community, a set of shared normative understandings, shared conception of which characteristics of 
things and actions make them desirable or undesirable, shared values, a common currency of 
normative concepts.  But, again I must emphasise, we don’t take our places in this narrative at its 
fanciful beginning. Quite possibly, as noted above, nobody did. Whether values and preferences 
originally entered the world together back when they and the world were new is a question in 
human, possibly pre-human, prehistory about which it would be idle to speculate. But they certainly 
enter our lives, your life and mine, together. In this way, Hurley is right and her ‘subjectivist’ 
dialectical target is wrong. I am born into a space of values and reasons that shapes my, and our, 
reflective thought, my, and our, understanding of myself and ourselves, from our beginnings.  Yet 
that space was, and is, woven from the passions in our souls and without them there would be 
nothing for normative thought to be. Recognising this we can still say all the wise and sensible things 
that Hurley wants to say. The self is not an extensionless point, not something we postulate ex nihilo, 
we do indeed stand in constitutive relationships with our natural and social environments.   
Deliberation is interpretation where we search for coherence among the substantive values 
embedded in a conceptual repertoire that our social environment has, over many years before we 
ourselves arrived on the scene, fashioned and our natural environment has shaped. On Hurley’s 
realist view, however, it remains somewhat mysterious what she supposes these values are meant  to 
be. By taking desire, preference, evaluative commitment, the passions in our soul as prior to them 
not in their role in the shaping  of human life but in the order of philosophical explanation and 
reconstruction, that mystery is tamed.  
In my normative thinking I am never alone. Even when it looks very much as if I am. Even the 
disaffected adolescent sitting in his bedroom thinking about how much he hates the values of his 
teachers and parents is plugged into the Big Web no less than is the most fervent adherent of the 
gods of the copybook headings. It shapes his values. If Hurley is right it even shapes his 
understanding of his desires.  The conceptual repertoire with which he operates, that guides and 
constrains his thought is not of his making but was formed by the shared normative life of his culture 
over many generations. And indeed he is inescapably a child of his very particular cultural setting  
however much he may dislike it or rebel against it. It is no more open to someone living in Bronze 
Age Greece to be a disaffected teenager than it is to today’s disaffected teenager to be a bronze age 
warrior.40 It is no more an option for Agamemnon to be Jim Stark than it is for Jim Stark to be 
Agamemnon.   His possibilities are limited by the social and institutional environment he inhabits and 
this includes the very conceptual water in which he swims. 
This may sound like conventionalism where that is both a metaethical doctrine whereby the truth of 
a normative claim is fixed by the norms that prevail round here, wherever one happens to be and its 
normative corollary that one ought to defer to the norms that prevail round here, whatever they 
happen to be. And conventionalism looks like a pretty unappealing  doctrine, one that would appear 
to instruct inhabitants of the Ante-Bellum South to approve of slavery, citizens of Nazi Germany to be 
good Nazis, etc.  But really no. The constraining power of convention is weaker than that and is 
wholly consistent with very  significant levels of disagreement, pluralism and criticism of the status 
                                                             
40 I here echo a well-known observation of Bernard Williams. See his 1985, p. 161. Compare what Stuart 




quo. Walzer and Martha Mussbaum, among others, have made this case  well.41 Here is Janet 
Radcliffe Richards: 
 
So the arguments through which traditional feminism reached its first conclusions involved no 
departure from familiar standards of evidence and argument in ethics, epistemology, and 
science, but actually presupposed them. It was by appeal to these standards that the position 
of women was first claimed to be wrong. And notice that all arguments of this kind also 
depend on absolutely ordinary logic. It is because the traditional conclusions do not follow 
from the traditional premises, or because traditional beliefs are incompatible with traditional 
standards of assessment, that the challenge to the received view in its own terms is possible. 
Here, then, are the beginnings. Although feminism, as a critical movement, necessarily 
challenges parts of the status quo, it typically does so, at the outset, by appealing to other, 
more fundamental parts that it holds constant. Feminism as a movement started with the 
broad standards of moral and empirical investigation and argument that most other people 
accepted at the time, and the recognition that these could not support familiar, supposedly 
commonsensical, ideas about women and their position.42  
 
What does begin to make much less sense is the idea of a radical ruputure with the past, a 
thoroughgoing determination to break with all tradition and begin completely anew;; The dream, 
back in the day, of revolutionary thinkers Tom Paine to ‘begin the world over again’43: it has its more 
modern adherents: 
The Proletarian Cultural Revolution is aimed not only at demolishing all the old ideology and 
culture and all the old customs and habits, which, fostered by the exploiting classes, have 
poisoned the minds of the people for thousands of years, but also at creating and fostering 
among the masses an entirely new ideology and culture and entirely new customs and habits 
— those of the proletariat. This great task of transforming customs and habits is without any 
precedent in human history. As for all the heritage, customs and habits of the feudal and 
bourgeois classes, the proletarian world outlook must be used to subject them to 
thoroughgoing criticism.44 
We know the story. It didn’t go well. This way, we can now be pretty confident, madness lies: we 
know that anyone who might aspire to inaugurate a kind of normative Year Zero, to radically 
                                                             
41 Walzer 1993, Nussbaum 2001, chapter 8. 
42 Radcliffe Richards 1995, 371. Compare Nussbaum 2001, p. 258:  
 
For example, a feminist opponent of Aristotle's conservative view about the social role of women 
could try to show Aristotle that a progressive position actually preserves certain deep human 
beliefs about the equal humanity of other human beings better than his own political theory 
does. If Aristotle agreed about the conflict, and agreed that these other beliefs were deeper (i.e. 
that the cost of giving them up would be greater, or one we are less inclined to pay), then we 
would expect him to change his view. The method does not make new discoveries, radical 
departures, or sharp changes of position impossible, either in science or in ethics. 
 
43 Paine 1776, Appendix. 
44 Boda 1966. This was one of the core texts that launched the Cultural Revolution in China. 
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reconstruct the normative world de novo and ex nihilo is in the grip of a foolish and dangerous 
fantasy. The aspiration to wipe the slate clean and start anew has often proved beguiling but we 
know well enough how easily that leads to a nightmare of murderous nihilism. The point in a way is 
no more complicated than the First Principle of Neurathian Boat Repair. If you try to rebuilt it all at 
once, in one go, while remaining at sea, you sink. In the very act of criticising the traditional moral 
order, we depend on and are sustained by  it. 
Here metaethical concerns shade into more substantive normative issues. Consistent with the rules 
of Neurathian boat repairm there are genuine choices to be made. Some may err on the side of 
deference to the inherited normative web. For others it is a focus of some suspicion and scorn. After 
all, they may say, the norms and values we inherit are shaped unduly by the powerful and in 
consequence leave much to be desired from the standpoint of justice. But of course – and this is the 
point Radcliffe Richards makes so very well – any ideal of justice in play here is itself part of what we 
have inherited. 45Plausibly virtue here lies in a mean. Both the overly deferential and the unduly 
iconoclastic attitude to our inherited normative world  are things that can readily be overdone.  
 
Certainly we need to distinguish between an emphasis on diachronic normative stability as 
something a measure of which is essential if normative thought is to get, and remain, off the ground 
at all, and am emphasis on it as a kind of virtue, something that is a desideratum of normative life 
well lived. We can make this distinction both when we consider intrapersonal stability46 on an 
individual level and when we consider the wider kind of stability that is both interpersonal and 
intergenerational.  On both narrow and broad diachronic stability as a good, Stuart Hampshire writes 
well: 
 
Many of the moral claims that persons recognise are changed or modified as time passes; but 
their dispositions and moral beliefs ought to be reasonably consistent over time; and they 
would be ashamed if there were too many abrupt moral conversions, with their own past 
repudiated. They recognize moral claims that arise from the requirement that their lives, or 
some considerable part of their lives, should exhibit some consistency of aim and some 
coherent character. And explanation of their moral claims would have to be, partly at least, 
historical, referring to their past and their consciousness of their past. As for persons, so for 
institutions; they also need some continuity, if their individuality as distinct entities is to be 
preserved; their history ideally has to make sense as the story of something that had a well-
defined character, while it existed, a character of its own.47 
 
Summing up, there is something deeply right in the interpretation-view of normative epistemology. 
We cannot move the normative conversation forward without getting clear about where it has 
arrived so far.  It isn’t a question of according some kind of brute authority to any part of the Big Web 
of our inherited moral consciousness.  On the contrary. To interpret is to make sense, to fit a given 
normative thought into the space of reasons surrounding it, or perhaps sometimes to discard it as 
                                                             
45 Compare Nussbaum on the concern that method of reflective equilibrium and its Aristotelian adumbration is 
unduly conservative in her 2001 chapter 8. 
46 I say a lot about intrapersonal stability in Lenman 2008 and Lenman 2011. See also Tiberius 2000, 2002 and 
2008.  
47 Hampshire 1983, pp. 165-6. 
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mistaken having failed to do so. This is the very opposite of arbitrariness. The authority of the whole 
thing is another matter. In the last analysis, it’s who we are, or, when critical reflection has done its 
work, it’s the expression in normative thought  of who we are that we are best able to reflectively 
endorse in living together in society lives that we hope will bear our survey.  When our scrutiny 
comes to bear on the whole thing, something it ordinarily does only in moments of philosophical 
refection and not in the ebb and flow of ordinary normative life. In the last analysis, then, the 
passions in our soul remain the source of normativity. Horizontal rational conncet6ions across the Big 
Web protect us from arbitrariness and keep the day to day life of reason in business. Vertical 
connection between the web as a whole and the passions in our souls, our desire to live and flourish 
in the world informed by the values that inform it dispose us to engage with the normative life it 
informs. Dispose us to and also, in a way, justify us in, though even in saying that I speak from a 
perspective inside the web, not somehow from somewhere altogether outside it.  That isn’t 
existentialism, merely humanism. As Dworkin – yes, Dworkin - puts it ‘We want to live well and to 
behave decently, we want our communities to be fair and good and our laws to be wise and just.’48  




Exhibit G. Aristotle 
We start from the things known to us but us is not just anyone. These things can only be known with 
the eye of what Burnyeat calls ‘educated perception’ informed through ‘knowing of specific actions 
that they are noble or just in specific circumstances’49. That is why Aristotle  supposes the study of 
ethics is only for those of mature years who have been well brought up to virtuous habits 
(Nicomachean Ethics, 1095a-b, 1179b-1180b). Such a person’s emotions align naturally with what is 
good and right and this equips them to orient themself ethically without proofs and arguments. If 
you are well brought up you don’t need these to see what is right. If you are not they won’t help you 
(1179b-1180a).  Once someone has attained such a state they can embark on the study of ethics 
where they seek to impose some systematic coherence on their educated ethical sensibility, reduce it 
to some sort of order,  whereby they can locate particular judgements in a wider space of reasons. 
The starting points of our ethical thought are then found to support and be supported by other items 
in the normative landscape (thus we reason both apo tōn archōn and epi tas archas (1095a), from 
and to our starting points).  So it comes that arriving in the ethics classroom equipped with the that, 
we may there acquire the skill of grasping the because.50  We impose order on what the eye of 
educated perception sees.  This process of education, of habituation into virtuous habits, is one of 
assimilating from an early age the that, the shared ethical understandings of one’s society, not just 
discursively as propositional knowledge but actively as shaping our agency. If you’re not emotionally 
plugged in you’re not in the game. Aristotle’s ideal student is both, loving  virtue, having been raised 
to do so. ‘We do base things for the sake of pleasure and abstain from noble things on account of 
pain. That is why we must be brought up right from our infancy, as Plato says, to delight in and be 
                                                             
48 Dworkin 2011, p. 68. 
49 Burnyeat 1980, p. 72. 
50 See my epigraph above, It is worth noting that in the phrase “τὸ ὅτι” which I translate ‘”the that” the word 
“ὅτι” means “that” in its sense as a subordinating conjunction, not a demonstrative pronoun.  Most translators 
don’t leave it in this raw form. So e.g. Hardie (1980, p. 34) has ‘the fact’, Broadie and Rowe (2002, p. 97) ‘that it 
is so’ . 
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pained by the right things. That is what a good education is.’ (1104b) To have been so educated is to 
be in possession of the that, to have absorbed and internalised the normative outlook  of one’s 
society leaving one ready and able to embark on the philosophical enterprise of grasping the 
because. It is to have acquired an affective character shaped by a normative conceptual repertoire 
absorbed from  one’s wider social world. Only when that is in place, for Aristotle, can serious ethical 
theoretical reflection begin.  Far from being a blank slate or an extensionless point, the self at the 
outset of normative inquiry is already shaped the normative conceptual world of its forebears and 
peers.   
Mackie is right. Sort of.  Morality is not discovered  but made. But the past participle is apt: made. It 
is not something we discover the way we discover the facts disclosed by physical science. It is a 
human thing but it is not a new one.  It is something we shape but to shape it intelligently we must 
understand and appreciate the shape we find it with.  
We can contrast two ways in which we might understand the enterprise of moral inquiry, the story of 
construction and the story of interpretation.51 They seem to compete but really they do not. For no 
sooner is the process of constructivism is underway, no sooner does it become a thing with a 
direction and a history apt to shape and inform its future development than interpretation takes its 
place alongside construction as an essential part of the story. The normative world is a world of our 
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